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What is Life Worth?
A Rough Guide to Valuation
In this speculative article, the aim is to elaborate a definition of life that is not
biological, and a valuation of it that is not commodified. This is undertaken by the
development of an understanding of death as a process which is embedded in the life
of a community. The idea is that we can best understand what life is worth by first
understanding what death means. [death, life, humanitarian, mortality, utopian]
I think about my education sometimes. I went to the University of Chicago
for a while after the Second World War. I was a student in the Department
of Anthropology. At that time, they were teaching that there was absolutely
no difference between anybody. They may be teaching that still.
Another thing they taught was that nobody was ridiculous or bad or
disgusting. Shortly before my father died, he said to me, “You know—you
never wrote a story with a villain in it.”
I told him that was one of the things I learned in college after the war.
—Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five
Archimedes, who was a kinsman and friend of King Hiero, wrote to him
that with any given force it was possible to move any given weight; and
emboldened, as we are told, by the strength of his demonstration, he
declared that, if there were another Earth, and he could go to it, he could
move this one.
—Plutarch, Lives
Give Me an Ethnography and I Will Move the World
Although much use is currently made of his work defining the biopolitical, it is
with Foucault’s earlier work on knowledge systems that I would like to begin. I
choose to go back to his praise of our discipline at the close of The Order of
Things because there he accords ethnology the status of “counterscience” among
the human sciences. With psychoanalysis, ethnology is a method of examining
thought by thinking in terms of thought’s limits; those boundaries that not only
characterize it as specific to a place and time (however universalist its claims) but
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504 Medical Anthropology Quarterly
also, and in the same process, show that there always remains something “other”—
an unthought—embedded within it.
Psychoanalysis and ethnology occupy a privileged position in our
knowledge—not because they have established the foundations of their
positivity better than any other human science, and at last accomplished the
old attempt to be truly scientific; but, rather, because, on the confines of all
the branches of knowledge investigating man, they form an undoubted and
inexhaustible treasure-hoard of experiences and concepts, and above all a
perpetual principle of dissatisfaction, of calling into question, of criticism
and contestation of what may seem, in other respects, to be established.
[Foucault 1970:373]
This topos is separated by the merest of dotted lines from the terrain occupied by
Le´vi-Strauss in his Tristes Tropiques. There, in chapter 38, entitled “A Little Glass
of Rum,” Le´vi-Strauss presents us with the central tasks of anthropology: First,
getting to know other societies in order to detach ourselves from our own (ours “is
the only one from which we have a duty to free ourselves: we are, by definition, free
in relation to the others”). Second,
using all societies—without adopting features from any one of them—[we
are] to elucidate principles of social life that we can apply in reforming our
own customs and not those of foreign societies . . . the society we belong to is
the only society we are in a position to transform without any risk of
destroying it, since the changes, being introduced by us, are coming from
within the society itself. [Le´vi-Strauss 1974]
His point is that “nothing is settled; everything can still be altered. What was done
but turned out wrong can be done again” (Le´vi-Strauss 1974:393).
More modest than Archimedes, but still Archimedean in intent, each man sug-
gests that ethnography’s aim is to find or build another Earth for us to stand upon,
and that ethnology provides the lever by means of which we can move this one.
(Latour [1990] would argue that the very practice of ethnographic observation—
uniting experience with experiment—makes this less impossible than it might ini-
tially seem.) Indeed, in the days in which “others” were exotic, and regarded as
somehow more “natural,” the social role of anthropology was precisely to rep-
resent (especially. I would say in a mid-century U.S. context) utopic possibilities.
We could look, say, at the way people came of age in Samoa (Mead 1928) to dis-
cover another way we could also be. Anthropologists Margaret Mead and Ashley
Montague were public intellectuals.
When the “otherness” of “others” became a function of our own myopia or
of our method (Clifford and Marcus 1986)—and, beyond that, when globalization
brought us all into a single economic and political social field—not only did we
cease to be engaged by the “strange,” we also ceased, or so it seems, to be engaged
by utopia. We focused instead on contradictions in circumstances and pathologies
of power (cf. Farmer 2005; Scheper-Hughes 1992). The justice-seeking, equalizing
tendencies fundamental to the ethnographic gesture turned from explanation to
comma
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A Rough Guide to Valuation 505
social critique, and there was a corresponding overall decline in our interest in
celebrating diverse logics for their own sakes. Indeed, one could argue that this
progress of our normal professional motives—and even this continuation of our
normal professional methods—has led us to be mainly concerned with the dystopic.
Given the significant and, it seems, increasing levels of social inequality in the
world, this is far from inappropriate. Yet to give this approach pride of place seems
also to mean confinement to a single underlying logic, a single overall world view. It
is as though we have integrated other people, without equally integrating other ways
of thinking. What I would like to do is find a way to get us back to an appreciation
of our responsibility for utopic possibilities (Auge 1998, 1999).
Our current area of study is the social field, rather than the life of a group, and our
method is situational analysis (Gluckman 1958). We work on a particular problem,
rather than on “culture” as some sort of abstracted whole. This is a more realistic
representation of our observational approach anyway, one already established by
the Manchester School (Werbner 1990) and having the virtue of being applicable
anywhere (Frankenberg 1981). Our proper study is of human originality (Guyer
1999), and our aim, at least in part, is the enhancement of logodiversity.
The challenge for ethnology will be to recuperate our former way of fabricating
and making available a way of seeing things otherwise, of looking at the world
from an angle that at first seems slightly awry. When we worked with other groups,
“the native’s point of view” was otherwise enough in itself. One had mainly to
explore and explain its rationality. The unified world, with our focus on social fields,
demands not only that we engage ethnologically from field to field but also that we
do so with greater imaginative impertinence than before. (Le´vi-Strauss’s marvelous
comparison of cannibalism and the prison system as a way of discussing savagery
and society comes to mind as a possible set of the bar [1974:386–389].) This
maintains our commitment to labor beyond the shadow of “primitive mentality”
even as we endeavor to contribute to an undoubted and inexhaustible treasure hoard
of experiences and concepts.
This is also a way of saying that ethnography’s cheek will often be to offer a
qualitative answer to a quantitative question. That at least is what I’m attempting
to do here; an essay in the strict sense of the term, in response to the question “What
is life worth?”
Food for Worms
The irony. Having just attempted to focus our attention on the utopic, I am asking
that we think about the morbid, starting with necrosis and gangrene http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Necrosis (accessed Oct. 26, 2012) and http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Gangrene (accessed Oct. 26, 2012) I want to start with them because
they are death in life and thus show better than would any more abstract consider-
ation the relationship between the two. Thinking of them in this, organism-centric,
way allows us to observe that death is something life does in response to a certain
type of insult or set of events or circumstances. Thus, we shouldn’t oppose life to
death so much as to non-life, a point to which I’ll return in a minute.
Taking this perspective is a way of getting me, of getting us, to be more conscious
of what it is we mean when we talk about life—that is, to understand life in terms of
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506 Medical Anthropology Quarterly
vitalism or vitality. The sense I have often had is that even when we talk about life
and about the body, in our discussions these still maintain a thing-like or mechanistic
quality. We lose the sense of life as a precarious, somewhat unstable process, but one
that is, nevertheless interested in staying alive and that therefore has a relationship
to the environment that is already charged, and value-laden. This, of course, is from
Georges Canguilhem’s brilliant exploration of the normal and the pathological
(1989). Once we see life itself as interested, we establish at least three possibilities
for our ways of thinking.
One way is to make human life continuous with other life, including the lives
of the microbes that would be interested in the opportunity afforded them by
necrosis. From the perspective of “life itself” this would be a mere shift from view-
ing life as it is valued by one organism to including the perspective on that life
taken by its various opportunistic others. This is a specification exemplified by the
work of Stelarc (http://www.stelarc.va.com.au/ accessedOct. 26, 2012), particularly
his “Ear on Arm” project and the “Partial Head” project.
Stelarc is an Australian born artist whose current projects are based on the
idea that the body is obsolete and that all of its functions will eventually come to
be replaced by technologies that themselves can be repaired and maintained on a
continuous basis. His view is that we live in an age of circulating flesh, of fractal
flesh in which organs can also live without bodies. The theory of his practice is
posted on his website; his practice is inscribed in his own flesh.
I just want to borrow a few points from his experience. When we look at his
acknowledgements for the two projects in question, we see that, for the moment
at least, the postobsolete body takes more people and money to run than does the
current, obsolete, intermediate technology type body we have now. Such is often
the case with new technologies and this is something of a sidebar observation.
More to the point, in each of the examples above, the purism of Stelarc’s utopic
or theoretical vision was disturbed or interrupted by life itself. The initial implant
of the ear in the arm resulted in cell death (necessitating surgery) and infection.
The partial head (which involved the use of live cells in a growth medium) became
contaminated after a week and had to be preserved in formaldehyde. So we see that
there is a sort of incontinence inherent to vitality, one that is temporarily held in
check by the skin (or membrane if you are a cell)—itself an outcome or function of
the vitality within. On this view, life is continuous and death encompassed by it.
Another possibility is to think about how life is continuous with the non-life that
exists or can exist within it. Here, just as two examples, I am thinking of paracetamol
poisoning and of the actions of prions (Ridley and Baker 1998). Descriptions of these
can be found here: http://www.patient.co.uk/doctor/Paracetamol-Poisoning.htm
(accessed Oct. 27, 2012) here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracetamol_toxicity
(accessed Oct. 27, 2012) and here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A531776 (ac-
cessed Oct. 27, 2012).
In each instance, it is the actions of molecules—objects not themselves alive and
so indifferent to the interests of the life form of which they are a part—which make
the pathology.
Finally, the vitalist perspective helps us to recognize in all forms of life a capac-
ity for responsiveness, which allows them to approach the minimum threshold of
the status of subject. This quality is what permits nonhuman subjects to serve as
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“witnesses” to the validity of human experiments (Haraway 1997). The idea of the
body itself as meeting this minimum I have borrowed from the vernacular medi-
cal system practiced by people in Mpala in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Davis 2000). There, the body, and other vital processes (such as beer brewing) can
be made to serve an oracular function. In each of these cases vitality is provided
with an apparatus that allows it to speak (Latour 1983, 1990).
This draws our attention to the respect in which all medical interventions might
also be seen as forms of dialogue, at best, or, at the very least, as forms of experi-
mental intervention, with life itself as the respondent or interlocutor. In this sense,
to reason anthropologically from medical practice—taking it as a model and a site
of knowledge production—is to think in terms of an anthropology of medicine more
than a medical anthropology (which seems to presume that we know what medicine
is). So, with this blurring of boundaries between life and death made thinkable for
our purposes (and within the biomedical episteme), we can perhaps begin to look
at what life is worth by thinking about what death means.
Mortality and Moral Community
Normal Mortality, So to Speak
In the opening paragraph to their Celebrations of Life, Metcalf and Huntington
observe that nothing could be more universal than death, and yet nothing can match
the wide variety of practices by which human beings engage with the decomposition
of the body (Metcalf and Huntington 1991), a decomposition that is in fact the
appropriation of one life form by others. The work of Cedric Mims provides a
comprehensive survey of what happens when we die (Mims 1998). At the level of
the social, there is, as Hertz noted, a correspondence between the decay of the corpse
as an object, and the reconstruction of the person beyond it (Hertz et al. 1960). That
mortuary ceremonies are intended to reweave the social fabric is an anthropological
commonplace.
Nevertheless, reminding ourselves of the very physical engagement people have
had with death is meant to serve, in turn, as a gateway to considering the produc-
tivity of mortality in social life; its use and usefulness in the production of moral
community. Beyond mortuary practices themselves, there are the issues of descent
and inheritance.
The Central African practice of “perpetual kinship” (Cunnison 1951, 1956,
1959), for example, means that there is an exchange relationship between sublin-
eages or lineage segments, which is such that the name, spouse, and indeed the life
of a deceased person from one segment is inherited by someone nominated from
the other. By this means, a living individual may accumulate a number of names
across her or his lifetime. Kinship terms of reference are changed accordingly, and
in genealogies only one name will be given even though that identity may have been
occupied by a number of different people. (This makes for funny anthropological
experiences.)
It’s not so much that “perpetual kinship” creates stasis despite death (a sort of
old-school structural-functional way of looking at things), as that death is part of
how microhistory is made and marked at the level of life as lived. It is an honor to
Death
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be named as heir and the relationship between sublineages is such that people are
almost on the point of forgetting how they are actually related (Davis 2000:214.)
Death is thus the way in which the living social order moves itself through time.
Only the oldest members of the groups can recall the name of the ancestress who
unites them, so memory itself exists at the edge of its own perishing; the point
in the system’s vital dehiscence at which one definitively becomes two, relation
nonrelation.
The differences in perspective are like the contrasts marked out by de Certeau
when he opposes the experience of viewing lower Manhattan from the top of the
World Trade Center with the experience of actually walking in the city (1984). One
view gives the city as coherent and seemingly stable, the other an understanding
of the city as the multitude of irregular trajectories and memories that are created
as people go about their everyday lives. In kinship and inheritance, death and life
are interwoven in such a way that death or the possibility of death—and indeed
the ultimate certainty of death—are what make possible moral community and its
production over time. (Here I am implying that the very concept of “reproduc-
tion” is a mistake. There is only production. Every birth is a perilous passage for
both mother and infant. Every face coming into the world has never before been
seen.)
The constant awareness of death (including its social correlatives, i.e., inatten-
tiveness to and disregard for death) underpins moral community as mediated by
therapeutic and divinatory practices. I am thinking here of the role of illness as
something that not only prompts accusation but also signifies mortality in a way
that makes clinging to grievances seem selfish, self-regarding and nonsensical. In
Turner’s lovely study of an Ndembu doctor in his practice, Kamahasanyi’s suffering
is exacerbated by the fact that his relatives don’t seem to take it seriously even
though they are morally obliged to treat it as such (1967). In my own work, know-
ing one would die or would someday need help was meant to have a moderating
effect on behavior (Davis 2000) even though it often didn’t.
Here, there is also something of an overlap. In the circumstances of problematic
illness, there is a shared questioning across cultures, locations, social fields. There
is an interest in producing knowledge that links anthropologists and those with
whom they study life. In the context of medicine, life is a problem for knowledge.
Illness can be problematic, and the shared question in the face of it is “What is to
be done?”
Pathological Mortality, So to Speak
The idea of “wasted life” (Fassin 2009) marks the boundary between normal mor-
tality and its opposite. Like all boundaries between normal and pathological, it is
moving (Canguilhem 1989). With the perception of life as wasted, there is not so
much the question of “what is to be done?” as there is the exhortation of “some-
thing must be done!” It indicates a state of extremity that can be partly due to the
sheer quantity of mortality—the numbers—but also due to the type of mortality;
the sense that a capability or talent for life has been interrupted or even that the
person’s (or the organism’s) own death has been stolen. In this, we might say we see
the frontiers of moral community as inscribed in mortality.
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The exhortation points to the frontier itself, attempting to force a community
to look beyond its comfortably familiar interior and to see the violence of its own
foundation in the process. Such would be the effort of Povinelli’s piece, “The child
in the broomcloset,” which seeks to draw moral attention to the link between the
conditions of Aboriginal Australians and the prosperity of the settler community
(2009). However, from a properly ethnological perspective, the remedy for which
the exhortation calls can’t be predetermined.
The response to “wasted life” could be remediation via redistribution of re-
sources, as is suggested by Farmer, Scheper-Hughes and many others. Here the
intention is clearly to improve the action of moral community, to better protect
those left on its economic and political margins. It could be retaliation, as we see
in the work of Ashforth (2005) and Godoy (2002, 2006) where the response to
the waste of life is vigilantism. (Human beings are never more inclined to be bar-
barous than when they think themselves confronted by barbarity.) It could, for that
matter, be extermination, as in the concept of “life unworthy of life” (Agamben
1998; Burleigh 1994), in the face of which death can be construed as a kind of
deliverance.
Lethality and Moral Community
What I’m trying to do at this point is to consider the ethical or moral parameters
within which quantification takes place or makes sense because these parameters
will condition what is “too much” mortality or “too little” vitality. This is another
way of thinking about what life is worth by considering what death means, bearing
in mind that the one quantity we will never find is “enough.”
I am pondering lethality as a kind of hinge on which these parameters turn—that
is as a social form by which they can be changed, moved, reconstituted. On this
view, lethality, and narratives from or of it, can be quite directly transformative
of the boundaries of moral community in a way other types of mortality are not.
One could think of it as having alchemical properties—that is as being socially
“alchemical” (Davis 1993, 2002; Jacobson 2006; Williams 1991).
It would be good to start by distinguishing lethality from other related terms
occupying the same or similar semantic terrain. As far as I have been able to explore
them, rough distinctions would be:
Mortal—death from within, the vulnerabilities of the flesh
Fatal—death from without—accident, blow, etc.,
Deadly—likely to cause death, but not necessarily designed to do so (as in the way
a wrench or hammer can be a deadly weapon)
Lethal—certain to cause death, though death may not always result (a gun is an
obvious example of a lethal weapon).
So, this particular feature of the lethal—this point about certainty—iswhatmakes
it an alchemical value changer. Thought and prospection are involved; intention
plays some part in the process. This certainty is what locates lethality right at the
heart of our condition as empathic predators, and I would say that recognizing this
condition is fundamental to any comprehensive understanding of human being. It
broom closet
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is our (definite) curse and our (potential) redemption as creatures—the foundation
of our basic dilemma as social actors.
We know things will kill and we know torture hurts because we’re empathic,
but because we’re predacious we do them anyway. In the doing, we attempt to
protect our capacity for empathy by defining our “victims” as those deserving of
the treatment we inflict on them. In which sense, one can say that lethal behavior is
always in defense of something, even though, in so saying, we are clearly marking
a broad circle of comprehension. This is not comfortable for us as citizens, but it is
consistent with our professional obligation as understanders of human being.
Going back to the “wasted life” section above, then, it is this characteristic that
makes us, as human beings, wish to respond to the “life wasters”with death, whether
through mob violence, eugenicist “cleansing” of the body politic, or state homicide
(Sarat 2001). Yet built into the witnessing, the narration of this very process, is the
possible evocation of pity for the killed. This comes up in the commentaries reported
by Godoy (2002), and in histories of execution at the points where executions ceased
being public at least in part because they were no longer considered to be edifying.
There was the risk of the public sympathizing with the executed, rather than being
in awe of the state power authorizing the execution (Foucault 1979; Le Graw and
Grodin 2002).
Here, I just want to make the point that because of this aporia—this basic
contradiction in our being—lethality and pity are twinned. One evokes and also
refutes the other. This can make casualties of perpetrators as with post traumatic
stress disorder (Gutmann and Lutz 2009; Shay 1994; Young 1995) Or, in another
of those fine ironies that characterize human being, the introduction of a “humane”
form of killing can increase the use of killing as method of punishment. Le Graw and
Grodin (2002) report that the introduction of lethal injection lead to an increase in
the number of executions, while descriptions of a “botched” execution made visible
the suffering of the man condemned (Mackey 2009) and led to the postponement of
two other executions pending the revision of lethal injection procedures (Driehaus
2009).
This labile twinship between lethality and pity is all the more alchemical when
the lethal behavior is self-destructive, but also altruistic or self-sacrificial. Two
classic accession attempts come to mind. Each involves the efforts of a group
to accede to the full dignity of citizenship and social equality through a willing-
ness to kill and be killed on behalf of the state, to make the ultimate sacrifice as
politicians would say (see Taussig-Rubbo 2009a, 2009b). These are the African
American Massachusetts 54th during the U.S. Civil War (http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/54th_Massachusetts_Volunteer_Infantry, accessedOct.27, 2012) who pre-
ferred to fight for no salary, rather than to accept the debased terms on which their
participation in the Union Army was based. The 110th Battalion of the 442nd
Regimental Combat Team made up of Japanese Americans during World War II
(Advertiser 2007), all of whom had volunteered directly from internment camps.
Although much more has also been required, self-sacrifice is an important means of
having one’s condition recognized and one’s intelligence respected, and the politics
of lethal behavior is not confined to combat situations.
An article in the New York Times has informed us that Hmong shamans are
now allowed to practice in hospitals in California (Brown 2009). A certification
and the
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system and set of protocols for shamanic practice were adopted after it became
clear that people were risking or sacrificing their lives, in biomedical terms, because
of the institutionalized incompatibility between hospital and shamanic treatment.
Respectful attention was drawn to the dilemmas of this cultural difference via the
publication of a popular book centering on the lethal outcome of misunderstanding
over medical treatment (Fadiman 1997). It is, of course, also worth noting that the
Hmong community came to be in California through a type of self-sacrifice similar
to the ones noted above—in this instance, loyalty to the United States during the
war in Vietnam.
In a final example, we can consider the consultation about and change to U.K.
guidelines concerning the prosecution of those who help relatives seeking assisted
suicide in Switzerland. The lawsuit brought by Debbie Purdy highlighted the com-
plexities of altruistic lethality (Davies 2009; Topping 2009) Although assisting or
encouraging anyone to commit suicide remains a crime (carrying a penalty of up
to 14 years in prison), in the aftermath of Purdy’s legal victory (and in view of the
100+ cases of people seeking assisted suicide with no actual prosecution of their
relatives), the Director of Public Prosecutions issued guidelines outlining conditions
under which prosecutions are and are not likely to be brought. From the perspective
of this discussion, the lethal behavior of supporting relatives has contributed to a
change in the position of the state and community with regard to this mortal, moral
dilemma.
So, in these examples, we see the crude outlines of the formula for social change—
for the movement of moral boundaries via the alchemy of lethality.
There needs to be numbers of people engaging in the practice—not themselves as
weapons or as means of destruction, but as actors protecting or respecting a
principle.
The choice has to be clearly connected to a particular, comprehensive and rational
end.
It has to be made visible—has to be made to emerge from the local and from the
noise of the everyday by some means of publicity or other.
These together create a condition or situation on the basis of which a case can be
brought—and/or changes to policy made with the help of people not necessarily
immediately affected
This set of criteria and sequence of events resembles that by which actions of militant
nonviolence can lead to social change. There are comparable social costs (deaths,
lengthy struggle), as well as comparable vulnerabilities (uncertainty of outcomes,
perverse, or unintended consequences). The relationship between lethality andmoral
community is, of course, always political.
Reconstructing Charity
To bring us back to our opening discussion, what I’m getting at is that, at this
moment, the utopic can’t be a pure, ahistoric form. It can’t be set in pure principle. It
can’t be whole, complete, or even enduring, but must always include fragmentation,
dirt, death, mess. This is not where I wanted my thinking to take me.
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I had wanted to make this into an argument about diversities of logic; an ar-
gument, that is, in favor of continuing respect for other modes of understanding
vitality—modes other than the biological. I wanted to use the analysis here to de-
velop a common ground on which multiple modes could be compared. The point
would have been, therefore, to restore to anthropology some of its function of al-
lowing not only other voices to be heard, but also other understandings of life to be
accepted in and for the present. The aim was to restore to others a respect for their
thinking about how best to live and die.
This was to say that we should not in an unthinking way continue to accept
the consolations of the laboratory; the promissory note that there will one day be
the thing that will redeem them all—a vaccine or something similar, so that we are
helpful, but exempt from mess. This would have been an extension of an earlier line
of thinking (Davis 2007). It’s not what has emerged from this one.
However, I do find that I am able to argue that mess is inevitable, and that
theorizing from mess makes us start (and possibility end) in potentially ugly mortal
places. But it at least helps us rediscover the politics always already within our
customary (and now much derided) anthropological detachment. Before, we could
marvel at if not also admire the purism with which Le´vi-Strauss could respond to
the horrors of his time with his emphasis on the equalizing rationality of principles.
We could be grateful to him for having saved us from our own stupidity (caused by
using the sight-blunting concept of “the primitive” or its twin “the archaic”) with
a reconceptualization of history that might actually help us today come to think of
it (i.e., help us to understand that social processes can take us into as well as out of
barbarity; see Le´vi-Strauss 1963a, 1963b, 1966; Sontag 1966).
Now we have to gather our utopic alterities as small possibilities collected as
and where we find them. We must include looking for them in unexpected, even
conventionally unacceptable places. That is, we look for places of contradiction
within the blind spots of conventional wisdom, we look for good wherever people
are doing it, we recognize and appreciate human innovation–self-organization, we
proceed by means of the impertinent comparison. In this, we use our method and
our documentary artistry to pull from the complexities of life useable principles
that might be transferrable or deployable elsewhere. What we see is how charity
or compassion has to be recreated through whatever political language is made
available to it. An obvious example is the twinship of military deterrence and
eradication campaigns. Here, I am thinking not only of the militaristic metaphors
that inform approaches to public health, but also of how the quest for the ever-
receding goal fuels expenditure in these two areas. As Laurie Garrett observes with
regard to international public health initiatives, the giving is both generous and
limited (2007), while just giving the money away would be unthinkable.
There are other examples. When we think about the militarization of social life,
and consider not the army as an abstract entity, but the soldier’s body (Gray 1997,
2000, 2003) and the soldier’s mind we find ourselves thinking about the people who
become part of a postmodern military (Moskos et al. 2000). We are obliged to see
an army from its members’ point of view: as a moral community (Shay 1994), as an
organization whose survival depends on learning (Nagl 2005), as a social form itself
subject to the contradictions of blurred boundaries of sacrifice and labor (Taussig-
Rubbo 2009b), as well as of destruction and construction (as with the expansion
today,
transferable
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of Africa Command into building infrastructure, http://www.africom.mil/). The
military becomes visible as a mode of production, and the army as an employer of
precisely those people with whom ethnographers are normally in sympathy.
Inversely, by comparison, we can draw attention to war zones that are normal-
ized into invisibility. I am thinking here of Chicago’s south and west sides where the
high rate of homicide was brought to public attention by the gesture of a local priest
who flew the U.S. flag upside down; a “mayday!” call to the nation to attend to the
community’s wasted life (Pilkington 2009). Here, too, there is an originality of per-
spective and of social form in the community organization “CeaseFire”, now known
as “Cure Violence” (http://www.ceasefirechicago.org/cpvp.shtml, cureviolence.org,
accessed Oct. 27, 2012).
Their approach treats the violence as a public heath matter. They use evidence-
based methods for gathering information and setting targets (they are sponsored
in part by a school of public health). They use hospital emergency rooms as lo-
cations for interventions, they deploy violence “interrupters” (a title and function
that evokes Michel Serres’s [2007] observations on the innovative potential of the
parasite—the one who interrupts and redirects a flow)—people themselves past
perpetrators—to try to stop the cycle of killings. They represent themselves to oth-
ers as a type of social experiment in a city with a long history of political activism,
vernacular and otherwise, as well as a great literature depicting how things work
and how they don’t.
Inconclusion
As ethnographers and ethnologists in the anthropology of medicine, we are always
laboring along the confines of mortality. Here, on the ground, in the field, and by
a comparative method that gives attention to local complexities, we are precisely
where the praises of Foucault and the hopes of Le´vi-Strauss would have us be. If we
expand the language of the therapeutic, so that the core of our thinking is toward
the remedy (which can only sometimes be the medicine), if we expand the concept
to include not just the medical but also the legal and the political, we will find that
we are better placed than most to understand the power of the single instance to
change the world. I write an inconclusion because I suppose that what I’m saying is
that our utopia is always in the working toward it, in the labor of love that we call
a field science and its companion, a documentary art.
Note on Contributor
Christopher Davis conducted field research on the medical system of Tabwa people
living along Lake Tanganyika in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. She won the
2002WellcomeMedal for her book, Death in Abeyance. She is a regular contributor
to arts programs on BBC Radios 4 and 3.
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